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Abstract
We construct a model of redistributive politics where the central government is opportunis-
tic and uses its discretion to make transfers to state governments on the basis of political
considerations. These considerations are the alignment between the incumbent parties at the
central and state levels and whether a state is a swing state or not. A testable prediction
from the model is that a state that is both swing and aligned with the central government is
especially likely to receive higher transfers. We test this prediction using Indian data for 14
states from 1974-75 to 1996-97. We nd that a state which is both aligned and swing in the
last state election is estimated to receive 16% higher transfers than a state which is unaligned
and non-swing.
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1 Introduction
The allocation of grants (i.e transfers) from central to sub-national governments has always
been an important issue of scal federalism. Central government grants help to break the
linkage between revenue and expenditure assignments by levels of government and permit
the center to pursue various objectives. While the traditional literature on scal federalism
discusses these objectives from alternative perspectives, it assumes that the central government
is a benevolent planner,interested in maximizing social welfare.
The recent literature on political economy emphasizes the institutional constraints and
rigidities under which policies are formulated. In particular, policymakers are typically politi-
cal parties or politicians, who may be opportunistic and implement policies so as to maximize
their chances of re-election, or be partisan and so want to further the interests of their own
support groups. Of course, the pattern of transfers implemented by a benevolent government
will typically be very di¤erent from those followed by opportunistic or partisan governments.
While there are a number of theoretical and empirical models of opportunistic governments
proposed in the literature, the diverse nature of political variables that are used to proxy the
theoretical variables makes it important to test the theory in di¤erent settings. Our paper is
a contribution in this direction - we focus on a developing country, India.
Specically, we study the hypothesis that the central government transfers to state govern-
ments in India are motivated by political considerations. Our theoretical framework explicitly
incorporates the fact that di¤erent political parties may be in control of governments at dif-
ferent levels. This is important since the state government stands between" the central
government and the voters in the state. Central grants relax the budget constraints of state
governments and permit the state governments to increase their expenditure. To the extent
that voters in the state are unsure about how the additional expenditure is nanced, the ruling
party in the state also benets from increased central grants.
We assume that central grants are used to nance public projects in the states and that
they generate goodwill amongst voters for the ruling party at the center. However, since these
grants improve the welfare of the state population, the incumbent in the state also reaps some
of the benets. Of course, if the incumbent in the state and the center happens to be the
same party (i.e. the state government is aligned with the central government), then that party
derives the entire (electoral) benet of any additional expenditure in the state. On the other
hand, if say party L is in power at the center and party R is in power in state s, then some of
the electoral benets of additional expenditure in state s leaks" to party R. This gives party
L less of an incentive to give grants to this state.
The central incumbent party in our model seeks to maximize its expected vote share across
states. Given this objective, it follows that the central incumbent (and, hence, central grants)
will be especially biased in favor of states that are simultaneously aligned and relatively more
swing.1 We call this the Aligned Swing e¤ect. However, the swing factor may work very
di¤erently amongst those states which are ruled by the opposition party. Such swing states
may actually be discriminated against since some of the goodwill leaks to the party in power
1 Intuitively (see Section 2 for a formal treatment), we say that state s is relatively more swing than state
l if an increase in the goodwill generated by a political party results in a greater increase in its vote share in
state s than in state l.
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at the state and this leakage is costlier if the vote share of the state incumbent rises sharply
as a consequence.
We then use the model to analyze the political economy of center-state discretionary
transfers in India.2 The data provide strong support for the hypothesis that aligned swing
states receive higher grants than all other state types.
Our paper is not the rst to study such issues: Cox and McCubbins (1986), Dixit and
Londregan (1996)(henceforth DL), and Lindbeck and Weibull (1987)(henceforth LW) con-
struct theoretical models of tactical redistribution which describe how political parties design
their policy platforms in order to further their electoral goals. DL assume that parties design
tactical redistribution programs in order to maximize their (expected) vote share while LW
also consider the case where each partys objective is to maximize the probability of winning a
majority of the seats. These di¤erences in objectives may matter when the prior distribution
of support for the two parties is not symmetric (LW).
Our model di¤ers from the aforementioned papers in two ways. First, both DL and LW
discuss competition between two symmetric parties in campaign promises at one level of
government. In contrast, we emphasize the presence of an asymmetry due to incumbency 
specically, the role of the incumbent party is highlighted whereas the role of the challenger
party is suppressed. Second, we assume that there are two levels of government, center and
state. The latter feature has more in common with DL (1998). However, our baseline model
assumes that voters vote on party lines and do not distinguish between the two levels of
government while the focus of DL (1998) is on the issue of divided government. Moreover,
DL (1998) assume a symmetric role of state and central governments in redistribution and
maintain the assumption of two symmetric parties at each level of government. Our focus on
incumbency induced asymmetry allows us to derive the Aligned Swing e¤ect, which is novel
to this literature.3
Drawing on ideas in DL and LW, a small but growing literature has tested whether varia-
tions in central transfers to sub-national units can be accounted for by swing and alignment
variables entered separately. Using data on social assistance block grants from the central
government to communes in Albania, Case (2001), for example, tests the empirical validity of
the predictions implied by the two political objective functions outlined by LW. She concludes
that politics does matter in determining the pattern of block grants; in particular, swing com-
munes get higher block grants. Johansson (2003) analyzes data on grants from the central
government to the municipalities in Sweden and nds limited support for the hypothesis that
intergovernmental grants are inuenced by whether the municipality is swing or not. Our pa-
per contributes to this literature by showing the empirical relevance of the interaction e¤ects
of the swing and alignment variables for the case of India.4
2A part of central grants to states in India is governed by explicit formulas. Discretionary grants refer to
the part of central grants which is not governed by these formulas. See Section 3 for details.
3All the other models in the literature treat parties as symmetric, an assumption more suited to campaign
spending than grants, although Snyder (1989) discusses asymmetry between parties in general. Dasgupta et al
(2000) (the earliest version of this paper), was the rst to introduce the asymmetry due to incumbency, and
show the empirical relevance of the Aligned Swing e¤ect (an alignment-swing interaction) in explaining central
transfers in India.
4Two related papers that use Indian data are Rao and Singh (2001) and Khemani (2007). Using di¤erent
transfer variables they both test a bargaining model where alignment and the lobbying power of states are the
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The plan of the paper is the following. In section 2, we present the theoretical model while
Section 3 contains some institutional details. Section 4 describes the data. Sections 5 and
6 contain the empirical results. Section 7 provides some concluding remarks while the last
section is the Data Appendix.
2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we build on the DL and LW models of electoral competition to show how the
incumbent party at the center can use center-state transfers to promote its electoral prospects
by spreading goodwill among voters for the incumbent party at the center. There are two
parties, L and R, and two levels of government: center and state. The central incumbent
party (assumed to be L) may be interested in promoting the interests of the party at the state
level since a stronger state-level party is more likely to result in better performance in the
central elections in that state, but may also be interested in re-election at the central level.
It is possible therefore for the central incumbent party to have di¤erent objective functions
based on whether re-election is at the central or the state level. Our benchmark model focuses
on the rst case where the central incumbent party is interested in promoting the interests of
the (L) party at the state level. We then show that under some assumptions, the predictions
are consistent with a central incumbent party which is interested in maximizing its electoral
prospects in the central level re-election.
2.1 Benchmark model
Electoral competition takes place between two parties, L and R, at the state level. The central
incumbent is assumed to be interested in promoting the interests of the party at the state
level. Without loss of generality, let party L be the incumbent at the center. Let SL be the
set of states where the incumbent party is L, while SR is the set of states where R is the
incumbent.
Transfers from the center to each state s are used to nance development projects in the
state. These projects increase state incomes, and so the transfers generate some goodwill
amongst voters in the state. Since these grants are channelled through the state governments
(which also implement the projects), voters cannot perceive perfectly that it is the central
government (and therefore the L party) which is the source of a grant. Hence, the goodwill
generated by these grants is shared by both tiers of government, or more precisely, by the
incumbent parties at the two levels of government. Let  2 [0; 1]. Then,  represents the share
of the goodwill from per capita transfers that accrues to the central incumbent. The variable
 is known by the central incumbent and assumed to be exogenous in our model. It captures
the degree to which voters are aware of the source of a grant: e.g.,  is likely to be high if
a project is named after the Prime Minister or if voters are politically aware.5 Of course, if
main independent variables.
5 Is the central incumbent capable of attracting all of the goodwill generated by the central plan and centrally
sponsored schemes that it launches? For some schemes with names like Rajiv Gandhi (a prominent Congress
Party prime minister) or Pradhan Mantri (Prime Minister) in front of the scheme title  it is easy to deduce
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party L is in power in the state then party L receives the entire goodwill (shared between the
party at the center and at the state).
Within each state s, there is a continuum of voters of mass Ns who may di¤er in their
ideologies. A voter j located at Xj on the ideology spectrum [X;X] has preference Xj for
party R over party L. Xj is private information while the cumulative distribution function of
X in state s, denoted s(:), is common knowledge. We assume that the p.d.f. 0s(X) is strictly
positive and continuous for all X 2 [X;X]: To simplify notation, we assume that X =  X,
so that the midpoint is 0.
Voters in each state vote on the basis of two criteria: ideology and the amount of goodwill
received by the parties. Consider a state s 2 SL which has received a per capita grant of gs
from the center and let voter j in state s be located at Xj on the ideology spectrum. Noting
that party L has received a total goodwill of U(gs), with U(0) = 0; U 0(gs) > 0; U 00(gs) < 0; he
votes for the L party if:
U(gs) Xj  0 (1)
and he votes for party R otherwise. On the other hand, if s 2 SR, then party R (being the
incumbent at the state level) gets a share of the goodwill (1   )U(gs) while party L at the
center gets only U(gs): Hence voter j will vote for the L party i¤:
U(gs)  (1  )U(gs) Xj  0: (2)
The inequalities (1) and (2) generate cut-points, X(gs; L) and X(gs; ; R), for each state
such that for k = L;R, a voter located at Xj in state s 2 Sk votes for the L party i¤
Xj  X(gs; ; k). Note that  does not matter for the cut-point of an L state since voting is
on party lines regardless of the level of the party. It follows that:
@X(gs; L)
@gs
= U 0(gs) ;
@X(gs; ; R)
@gs
= (2   1)U 0(gs): (3)
The central incumbent engages in tactical redistribution of grants in order to inuence
the location of the cut-points X(; L) and X(; R) among states. Notice that given equation
(3), any increase in gs leads to a rightward shift in X(; L). In other words, an increase in
gs to a state s 2 SL has an unambiguous e¤ect - it improves the electoral prospect of party
L. The e¤ect of an increase in gs when s 2 SR is ambiguous. Suppose  is less than half.
Then, more goodwill accrues to party R which is the incumbent in the state than to party L,
the incumbent at the center. In this case, party R benets more than party L. However, if
 exceeds half, then the incumbent at the center receives a higher share of the goodwill, and
this results in a rightward shift in the cut-point, a shift that is smaller in magnitude than for
an L state as long as  < 1 (see equation (3)).
We assume that the tactical redistribution program of the central incumbent is subject to
two constraints. First, the total transfers must satisfy an overall budget constraint. Second,
where the money comes from. But, not all schemes are of this type; Saxena and Ravi (2006, p. 3-4), for
example, review the performance of selected anti-poverty schemes and highlight the confusion that results from
complicated scheme titles that keep changing as well. Our center-state grants data sums up central funding
over all central plan and centrally sponsored schemes; so, an assumption of goodwill leakages" ( < 1 in our
theoretical model) is not unreasonable.
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the central incumbent is also interested in maximizing total welfare accruing from grants. We
capture this aspect by specifying a function (gs), where (:) is the per capita welfare. We
assume that  is increasing and concave in gs.
In the benchmark model, where the center cares about helping the party at the state level,
a plausible objective of the central incumbent is to maximize the vote shares across states (or
equivalently, maximize a weighted sum of the probability of winning each state):
sNs (gs) + s2SLNss (X (gs; L)) + s2SRNss (X (gs; ; R)) (4)
The central incumbent then maximizes its objective function subject to the budget con-
straint: X
s
Nsgs = B (5)
by choice of grant allocation, gs. We assume that the central incumbents problem has an
interior solution. Assumption 1 below ensures that the solution is a global maximum. The
rst-order condition for a state s 2 SL is:
0(gs) + 
0
s (X (g

s ; L))U
0 (gs) =  (6)
and for a state s 2 SR:
0(gs) + 
0
s (X (g

s ; ; R)) (2   1)U 0 (gs) =  (7)
where  denotes the Lagrange multiplier and gs is the allocation of grants to state s that is
optimal for the central incumbent, L.
Before discussing the implications of equations (6) and (7), we consider the following
situation. Suppose state s does not receive any grant from the central incumbent. With gs set
equal to 0, notice that the cut-point in state s is pegged at 0. We interpret the density at the
cut-point 0, 0s(0), to be a measure of how swing state s is. For example, if state s has a higher
density than state l at the cut-point 0 i.e., 0s (0) > 0l(0) then this is interpreted as saying
that relative to state l, state s has a higher proportion of voters who are not ideologically
attached to either party (oating voters" or independents") and hence is more swing.
Our theoretical propositions relate variations in grant levels across states to variations in
states swing and variations in statesalignment with the central incumbent. However, we
need some further notation and extra assumptions in order to state the propositions formally.
Consider two states s; l and assume w.l.o.g. that 0s (0) > 0l(0). Let xsl be the rst crossing
point to the right of zero for the two p.d.f.s 0s;0l; let xsl be the rst crossing point to the
left of zero for the two p.d.f.s 0s;0l.
6 Given xsl, gsl is dened to be the grant level such
that X(gsl; L) = xsl; given xsl and  <
1
2 , gsl() is dened to be the grant level such that
X(g
sl
(); ; R) = xsl. So, the grant level gsl ensures that the resulting cut-point is xsl; the
grant level g
sl
() ensures that the resulting cut-point is xsl:
When state s 2 Sk; k = L;R; receives grant g from the central incumbent, let Vs(g; ; k)
denote the per person contribution of the state to the objective function of the central incum-
bent, given in equation(4). Thus, for state s 2 SL, Vs(g; ; L) is equal to  (g)+s (X (g; L));
6 If 0s;
0
l do not cross to the right of zero, set xsl equal to X; similarly, if 
0
s;
0
l do not cross to the left of
zero, set xsl equal to X. Clearly, 
0
s(X) strictly exceeds 
0
l(X) when X 2 (xsl; xsl):
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for state s 2 SR; Vs(g; ;R) is equal to  (g) + s (X (g; ;R)). We will assume that the
functions fVs(g; ; k)gs2Sk ; k = L;R; are concave in g.
Assumption 1: For all states s 2 Sk; k = L;R; Vs(g; ; k) is concave in g.7
Recall that fgsgs2S is the allocation of grants that is optimal for the central incumbent, L.
Proposition 1 considers the case wherein   12 (goodwill leakages are large") and shows that,
regardless of cut-point densities, states that are unaligned with the central incumbent receive
lower grants than states that are aligned. This is called the Alignment E¤ect, and it arises only
because in our model the role of incumbent parties is di¤erent from challenger parties, in that
state incumbents are able to reap the benets of grants coming from the central government
since voters are not able to distinguish the source of the grants.
Proposition 1: Consider two states s; l. If   12 , s 2 SL and l 2 SR; then gs > gl .
Proof The rst-order condition for state s 2 SL is given in equation (6) and the rst-order
condition for state l 2 SR is given in equation (7). Thus,
0 (gs)  0 (gl ) = 0l (X (gl ; ; R)) (2   1)U 0 (gl )   0s (X (gs ; L))U 0 (gs) (8)
Recall that we have assumed that 0s(X) and 0l(X) are strictly positive for all X 2 [X;X]:
Hence,   12 implies that 0l (X (gl ; ; R)) (2   1)U 0 (gl )   0s (X (gs ; L))U 0 (gs) is strictly
less than 0. Thus, gs > gl follows from the concavity of (:).
Consider now a comparison of two states that are both unaligned with the central incum-
bent. Assuming that equilibrium grants are small", Proposition 2 shows that  determines
whether the more swing of the two states is favored or discriminated against by the central
incumbent. For concreteness, consider two unaligned states s; l 2 SR and assume that 0s(0)
exceeds 0l(0) (i.e., state s is more swing than state l). Also, let  <
1
2 . In this case, the
relatively more swing state, s, receives lower grants than state l. The intuition behind this
result is that when voters are unable to distinguish the source of the grants, the credit may
go to the state incumbent instead of the central incumbent. Anticipating this, the central
incumbent will discriminate against states that are likely to swing the election in the wrong
direction. If, on the other hand,  > 12 , then grant levels are such that g

s > g

l : We refer to
the swing- interaction in the determination of grants for unaligned states as the Unaligned
Swing E¤ect.
7 If state s 2 SL or if s 2 SR but  > 1=2, then Assumption 1 is satised if s(X) is concave in X. If s 2 SR
and  < 1=2, concavity of s(X) in X does not ensure that Assumption 1 holds. However, the assumption will
be satised if  is su¢ ciently concave.
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Proposition 2 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Consider two states s; l 2 SR with 0s(0) >
0l(0). Then, g

s > g

l if  >
1
2 and 0 < g

s ; g

l < gsl. However, if  <
1
2 and g

s ; g

l < gsl(),
then this conclusion is reversed.8
Proof The rst-order conditions for states s; l 2 SR can be written as follows:
@Vs(g

s ; ; R)
@gs
= 0s (X (g

s ; ; R)) (2   1)U 0 (gs) + 0(gs) =  (9)
@Vl(g

l ; ; R)
@gl
= 0l (X (g

l ; ; R)) (2   1)U 0 (gl ) + 0(gl ) =  (10)
First assume that  > 12 . Since 
0
s(X) > 
0
l(X) for allX < xsl, it follows that @Vs(gs; ; R)=@gs >
@Vl(gl; ; R)=@gl if gs = gl < gsl. Concavity of Vs(:) and Vl(:) in g ensures that gs > gl when
gs ; gl < gsl if the rst-order condition is to be satised.
Now consider the case when  < 12 . Observe that if g < gsl(), then @Vs(g; ;R)=@gs <
@Vl(g; ;R)=@gl because (2  1)U 0(g) < 0 and 0s (X (g; ; R)) > 0l (X (g; ;R)). The propo-
sition follows from the concavity of Vs(:) and Vl(:) in g.
We next contrast two states that are both aligned with the central incumbent. Proposition
3 states that so long as equilibrium grants are small", the state which is more swing receives
higher central grants than the state which is less swing.
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Consider two states, s; l 2 SL. If 0s(0) > 0l(0)
and 0 < gs ; gl < gsl, then g

s > g

l .
Proof The rst-order conditions of states s; l 2 SL can be written as follows:
@Vs(g

s ; ; L)
@gs
= 0s (X (g

s ; L))U
0 (gs) + 
0(gs) =  (11)
@Vl(g

l ; ; L)
@gl
= 0l (X (g

l ; L))U
0 (gl ) + 
0(gl ) =  (12)
Since 0s(X) > 0l(X) for all X < xsl, it follows that @Vs(gs; ; L)=@gs > @Vl(gl; ; L)=@gl if
gs = gl < gsl. Concavity of Vs(:) and Vl(:) in g ensures that gs > gl when g

s ; g

l < gsl if the
rst-order condition is to be satised.
Consider now two states, s and l, where state s is aligned with the central incumbent and
more swing than state l. Proposition 1 demonstrates that if state l is unaligned with the
central incumbent and   12 , then equilibrium grants are larger in state s than in state l.
Intuition, based on considerations of swing and alignment, suggests that the central incumbent
8When  = 1
2
, grants to state s; l 2 SR do not a¤ect the two cut-points, which are xed at 0. Hence, the
rst-order conditions for the two states are 0(gs ) =  and 
0(gl ) = ; i.e., g

s = g

l .
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would continue to favor state s relative to state l even when  > 12 . A formal result to this
e¤ect can be derived once Assumption 2 is invoked.
Assumption 2: Consider any two states s; l such that s 2 SL; l 2 SR and 0s (0) > 0l(0).
Let  > 12 and a  (2   1): Then, a0l(ax)  0l(x) for all x 2 [0; xsl).9
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Consider two states, s; l such that s 2 SL
and l 2 SR. If 0s(0) > 0l(0), 0 < gs ; gl < gsl and  > 12 , then gs > gl .
Proof Since 0s(X) > 0l(X) for all X < xsl, it follows that @Vs(g; ; L)=@gs > @Vl(g; ; L)=@gl
if g < gsl (refer to equations (11) and (12)).
Observe that if g < gsl, @Vl(g; ; L)=@gl = 0l (X (g; L))U
0 (g)+0(g) is weakly greater than
@Vl(g; ;R)=@gl = 
0
l (X (g; ;R)) (2   1)U 0 (g) + 0(g) because X (g; ;R) = (2   1)U(g),
X (g; L) = U(g), U(g) < xsl, and Assumption 2 holds.
We have therefore established that @Vs(g; ; L)=@gs > @Vl(g; ;R)=@gl if g < gsl. The
proposition follows from the concavity of Vs(g; ; L) and Vl(g; ; R) in g.
Propositions 1, 3 and 4 yield the following conclusion. Consider a state s that is aligned
and more swing than state l (i.e., 0s(0) > 0l(0)). Then so long as equilibrium grants are
small", state s receives higher central grants than state l, regardless of the alignment of state
l. We refer to this feature of the optimal grant allocation as the Aligned Swing E¤ect.
Finally, note that if  was endogenous and subject to manipulation by the central incum-
bent, then it would want to reveal information about the source of grants in unaligned states:
hence, discretionary grants in unaligned states might be skewed in favor of grants that are
targeted" in the sense that it is clear to voters where the grants come from. Once  is made
endogenous, the role of state level incumbent politicians in trying to change  cannot be ig-
nored as well. We leave these extensions for future work. What we can say unambiguously
is that if all grants are targeted (i.e., provide information regarding the source of the grant,
 = 1), then alignment does not matter and only swing states are favored. We refer to the
exclusive importance of swing in determining the optimal allocation of targeted grants as the
Swing E¤ect for targeted grants.
Proposition 5 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Consider two states, s; l. If 0s(0) > 0l(0),
0 < gs ; gl < gsl, and all grants are targeted ( = 1), then g

s > g

l .
Proof If  = 1, the two cut-point equations (1) and (2) are the same. Hence, the rst order
conditions, equations (6) and (7), are also the same for all states. The results from Proposition
2 therefore apply to all states regardless of alignment.
9What this rules out is 0l(:) declining in [0; xsl) at too rapid a rate. Let m denote the minimum value
attained by 0l(x) in the interval [0; xsl]. Since 
0
l is strictly positive and continuous, m > 0: It is easy to show
that Assumption 2 is implied if: j00l (x)j  r for all x 2 [0; xsl) such that 00l (x) < 0; r = m=(a  xsl).
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2.2 Extension of the benchmark model
Suppose now that the central incumbent has a di¤erent objective function: it seeks to maximize
the chances of its own re-election at the central level. We assume that grants from the central
incumbent cannot be given directly to the constituency level  even if grants are made by
central ministries10, they can be targeted at particular constituencies only through the purpose
of the grants (e.g., village road building would benet all rural constituencies which do not
have roads but ner partitions are not possible).
We assume also that voters vote on party lines at both central and state level elections.
This means, in particular, that ideology of voters at the state level election is the same as at
the central level election, and so is the distribution of ideology on the interval [X;X]: Hence,
cut-points are determined exactly as before for each state: states that are relatively more
swing at state level elections remain relatively more swing at central level elections. If the
central incumbent has the same objective function i.e. to maximize its vote shares across
states in the central level election, then we get the same predictions as in Propositions 1-5,
but for central elections.
To summarize, when the objective function of the central government is to get re-elected
through maximizing the vote shares across states and voters are assumed to vote on party
lines, then the predictions of Propositions 1-5 still hold.
3 Institutional Details
In this section, we present some relevant facts about political institutions in India, outline the
electoral history of political parties since independence in 1947, discuss the basic structure of
center-state transfers, and provide examples of central government schemes nanced by the
central grant category on which our paper focuses.
3.1 Political Institutions
3.1.1 Electoral Rules
India has a parliamentary democracy at both the central and state levels. The central parlia-
ment, the Lok Sabha, has 543 members. The country is divided into 543 separate geographical
areas (that is, Lok Sabha constituencies), each of which returns one Member of Parliament.
The size and shape of the Lok Sabha constituencies are determined by an independent Delim-
itation Commission. The Commission ensures that Lok Sabha constituencies strictly respect
state boundaries and, as near as is practicable, have the same population. This means, of
course, that the number of Lok Sabha constituencies assigned to a state is in rough propor-
tion to its population.
Given single-member constituencies, elections to the Lok Sabha use the rst-past-the-
post system: a voter in a specic constituency casts a vote for one of the candidates up for
election in that constituency; the candidate mustering the most votes is declared the election
winner. While most candidates stand as Independents (that is, without formal a¢ liation with
10For example, the central plan scheme and centrally sponsored scheme categories of discretionary grants
discussed in the section on Institutional Details.
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any political party), successful candidates are usually representatives of recognized political
parties.11
State governments have their own parliament, the Vidhan Sabha, with assembly size de-
pending on state population (Uttar Pradesh has 425 members and Haryana, 90). The pro-
cedures for Vidhan Sabha elections exactly mirror those for central elections. Each state is
divided into single-member Vidhan Sabha constituencies (the boundaries of Vidhan and Lok
Sabha constituencies are di¤erent) and the rst-past-the-post system is used.
3.1.2 Government Formation
Once Lok Sabha election outcomes are declared and there is a single-party majority, the party
with the largest number of seats is invited by the president of India to form the central gov-
ernment. When there is no clear majority, coalitions with su¢ ciently large support can form
the government. The government that eventually forms, whether single-party or coalition,
must command the condence of a majority of the Lok Sabha members.
The constitution of India mandates that a national legislative assembly have a normal term
of ve years from the date appointed for its rst sitting. Hence, Lok Sabha elections must be
held every ve years, unless called earlier. Two circumstances lead to mid-term (that is, early)
elections. First, a government may lose the condence of the Lok Sabha. The president of
India, upon verifying that no claimant can form an alternative government claiming majority
support, conventionally calls for fresh elections. Second, a government may, principally for
electoral gains, voluntarily petition the president of India to dissolve the Lok Sabha and hold
mid-term elections; by convention, such recommendations are consented to. For the period
that we study (nancial year 1974-75 to 1996-97), Lok Sabha elections took place in 1977,
1980, 1984, 1989, 1991 and 1996.
The rules for government formation at the state level are identical to those at the center.
Once Vidhan Sabha election outcomes are declared, the governor of the state invites the party
with the largest number of seats to form the state government, which must command the
support of a majority of the Vidhan Sabha members. The constitution of India stipulates
that the normal term of a state legislative assembly is ve years from the date appointed
for its rst sitting. Hence, Vidhan Sabha elections are normally held every ve years, unless
called earlier.12 State elections were formally de-linked from central elections in 1969, when
several states held mid-term elections.
11For the period that we study (nancial year 1974-75 to 1996-97), Independent candidates constituted 60.7
percent of all candidates contesting Lok Sabha elections; however, Independent candidates won just 1.4 percent
of Lok Sabha constituencies.
12Three circumstances lead to mid-term Vidhan Sabha elections. First, a state government can lose the
condence of a majority in the state legislature. The governor of the state, upon verifying that no claimant can
form a government commanding majority support, calls for fresh elections. Second, the president of India, upon
receipt of a report by the governor of the state or otherwise, may be satised that constitutional breakdown
has occurred at the state level. This leads to the temporary imposition of Presidents Rule and, eventually,
fresh elections. Third, a state government may voluntarily petition the governor of the state to dissolve the
Vidhan Sabha and hold mid-term elections; by convention, such recommendations are consented to.
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3.2 Electoral History
The electoral history of India divides into two distinct phases. In the rst phase, which
spanned the years from independence in 1947 until 1967, the Congress Party monopolized the
electoral landscape: indeed, in this period, the Congress Party never obtained less than 70
percent of the seats in any Lok Sabha election and won all but two Vidhan Sabha elections.13
However the conuence of several crises between 1962 and 1966 (two severe droughts, an
unpopular currency devaluation, the death of party stalwarts such as Jawaharlal Nehru, and
so on) ensured that the Lok and Vidhan Sabha elections of 1967 marked the beginning of
a new phase in Indian politics: the Congress Party lost 78 seats in the Lok Sabha election
and retained a majority of just 23 seats; subsequently in the Vidhan Sabha elections, non-
Congress governments came to power in ve states. The post-1967 era has beheld lively
inter-party competition for seats at both the central and state levels.
Our theoretical model assumes that there are two parties: in reality of course India has
many parties, some of which may di¤er at the state and central levels. However, for the
period that we study, Table 1 shows that the Congress Party has been in power at the center
except for three phases: 1977-1980 (when the Janata Party was in power), 1989-1991 (when
a coalition called the National Front was in power), and 1996-1997 (when a coalition called
the United Front was in power). Adding up these three phases, the Congress Party was in
power at the center for all but a total of 4 years and 2 months. In the main, state elections
have witnessed two-party contests. For the period under review, the Congress Party was the
dominant party, engaged in competition with di¤erent parties in di¤erent states.
3.3 Fiscal Structure of States and Center-State Transfers
We now briey outline relevant aspects of the scal structure of state governments. The
revenue receipts of a state government derive from three sources: tax revenues raised by the
state government (e.g., through levying taxes on commodities), non-tax revenues raised by the
state government (e.g., from state lotteries), and transfers from the center. There are three
major channels through which the center transfers funds to state governments. These are
(i) tax devolution and grants by the Finance Commission,
(ii) grants by the Planning Commission, and
(iii) transfers on account of various central plan and centrally sponsored schemes by various
central ministries.
Category (i): The constitution of India species that the states are entitled to a share of the tax
revenues collected by the center; the aggregate share as well as the distribution amongst the
states is decided by Finance Commissions which are appointed at periodic intervals. Successive
Finance Commissions recommend explicit formulas to determine the allocation of central
13The electoral dominance of the Congress Party stemmed from at least two sources. First, the party was
universally admired for being the principal representative of the nationalist cause in pre-1947 India. Second,
the organizational network of the Congress Party was vastly superior to that of any other political party (see
Kothari (2001) for details).
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tax revenues amongst states. While these Finance Commission awards have been criticized
from time to time, it is generally agreed that the formulas are not inuenced by political
considerations. In addition to tax devolution, Finance Commissions are also required to
recommend grants to the states in need of assistance under Article 275 of the constitution of
India.
Category (ii): A sizeable proportion of central grants are also channelled through the Planning
Commission. From 1969, plan transfers have been e¤ected on the basis of a formula decided
by the National Development Council, which is chaired by the prime minister and contains
all cabinet ministers at the center, chief ministers of the states, and members of the Planning
Commission. Since grants on account of state plan schemes are based on this consensus
formula, we exclude them from the category of discretionary grants to the states.14
Category (iii): Central government ministries initiate a number of national programs (e.g.,
family planning) either by themselves or at the request of state level ministries. The specic
purpose transfers given to states through central plan schemes and centrally sponsored schemes
have attracted the sharpest criticism because these are essentially completely discretionary.15
Central plan schemes are funded entirely by the center, the states merely exercising an agency
role in executing these programs. Centrally sponsored programs involve some element of
cost-sharing between the center and the concerned state.
Our empirical model only considers grants which come under category (iii), thus explicitly
ignoring the general purpose and largely formula-based grants in categories (i) and (ii).1617
This choice of the grant variable is dictated by two considerations. First, category (iii) grants
are undoubtedly the most discretionary grants among those listed above. Second, category
(iii) grants t better with our theoretical model which has a central government unilaterally
choosing grants rather than bargaining between the center and states.
3.4 Examples of Central Plan Scheme and Centrally Sponsored Scheme
Grants
There are a large number of central plan and centrally sponsored schemes in place. Examples
of such schemes can be seen from the websites of the respective ministries. The Ministry of
Rural Development (http://rural.nic.in/) talks about a scheme called Bharat Nirman" under
which there are targets set down for electrication of villages, telephone connectivity, provision
of clean water to villages, and so on. The Ministry of Power has the responsibility for the
14Central assistance on account of state plan schemes has a large loan component as well. Central loans on
account of state plan schemes augment a states capital receipts.
15 In fact, Rao and Singh (2001) dene discretionary central grants to be those that exclusively nance these
two scheme types.
16Central assistance on account of central plan and centrally sponsored schemes has a small loan component.
We disregard this loan component in our empirical analysis since the loan rates are hardly subsidized.
17We note that our paper complements Khemani (2007), which focuses instead on central transfers under
categories (i) and (ii).
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electrication plan through a program called Rajiv Gandhi Vidyutikaran Yojana" and the
agency for implementation is the Rural Electrication Corporation, a public sector agency,
rather than the state government. On the other hand, for drinking water, the scheme is a
centrally sponsored scheme where state governments contribute 50 percent of the funds and
have a role in the targeting of beneciaries. Examples of other schemes under the Ministry of
Rural Development include Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana" (which provides bank
nance so that beneciaries can buy productive assets and be self-employed) and Indira
Aawas Yojna" (which provides houses to households below the poverty line).
4 The Data
The data set for our study consists of annual observations spanning the nancial years 1974-75
to 1996-97 for the 14 major states of India. Thus, we exclude from our study the so-called
special category states that receive exceptionally generous nancial treatment from the Indian
government on account of their specic problems (see Rao and Singh (2001) for further details)
and the tiny state of Goa, which was upgraded from union territory status as recently as
1987.18 In nancial year 1996-97, the 14 major states accounted for 83.1 percent of Indias
land area, 93.3 percent of her population, and 92.6 percent of the domestic product. The
details on sources of data and the method of construction of variables are provided in the
Data Appendix.
The grant variable that we use is dened as the per capita sum of central plan scheme and
centrally sponsored scheme grant levels in constant prices (1980-81 rupees). Column [1] of
Table 2 provides state-specic means and standard deviations of this grant variable computed
over the sample period. There is enormous across-state variation in the levels of per capita
grants. For example, per capita grants average 115.61 rupees in Rajasthan (high) and 38.69
rupees in West Bengal (low).
The set of explanatory variables are partitioned into two distinct categories. The rst
category, referred to as political controls, measures political attributes of states that are likely
to inuence central grant awards. The second category, referred to as other controls, measures
ostensibly non-political attributes of states (e.g., per capita state domestic product) that
capture the need for central assistance.
4.1 Political Controls
There are four main predictions from our benchmark theoretical model: (i) Alignment E¤ect,
(ii) Aligned Swing E¤ect, (iii) Unaligned Swing E¤ect, and (iv) Swing E¤ect for targeted
grants. Prediction (i) says that when the fraction of goodwill received by the incumbent at
the center, , is low, then independent of swing, an aligned state receives higher grants relative
to an unaligned state. Prediction (ii) states that an aligned and swing state obtains higher
grants relative to a non-swing state, whether aligned with the central incumbent or otherwise.
18The 14 major states are as follows: Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. In nancial
year 1996-97, India consisted of 25 states: the 14 above-mentioned major states, Goa, and 10 special category
border states.
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Prediction (iii) points out that if  is high, then a state that is unaligned and swing receives
higher grants relative to a state that is unaligned and non-swing. This conclusion is reversed
when  is low. We are unable to test predictions (i) and (iii) because they depend on the
unobservable : Since data on targeted grants are not available, we are also unable to test
prediction (iv). We discuss below how we translate prediction (ii) into empirically testable
hypotheses.
Our political variables are Swing and Alignment. We construct both as dummy variables.
The swing dummy is denoted SW : states are therefore categorized as swing (SW equals
one) or non-swing (SW equals zero). The alignment dummy is denoted AL. Consider a
linear regression model that includes the interacted regressors AL  SW; AL  (1  SW ) and
(1   AL)  SW and let ,  and  be the corresponding coe¢ cients. Then, prediction (ii)
implies that  > 0 and    > 0.
In order to proceed with the construction of the two crucial dummy variables, AL and
SW , we rst assume that decisions regarding the allocation of central grants to state s for
nancial year t are made at the very beginning of that nancial year (that is, March 31 of
nancial year (t  1)) using state electoral outcome information from the last Vidhan Sabha
election as well as the last Lok Sabha election.
We opt for the March 31 decision date because by that time, the amount of aggregate
central grants (on account of central plan schemes and centrally sponsored schemes) available
for disbursement in the forthcoming nancial year is formally recorded in the annual scal
budget of the central government and there is at least an implicit understanding in the Plan-
ning Commission regarding the grant amounts assigned to each of the states. This reasoning
notwithstanding, the March 31 deadline is of course somewhat arbitrary. So, in Section 6 we
report our results when the central grants-related decision date for nancial year t is pegged
instead at March 1 of nancial year (t  1) (that is, we bring forward the decision date by one
month).
We construct the alignment dummy as follows: ALst is dened as 1 if the central govern-
ment and the state government of state s on March 31 of nancial year (t  1) share at least
one political party in common and there is no Presidents Rule in state s on that date.1920
The state-specic averages for this variable are given in Column [2] of Table 2 and the listing
is given in Appendix Table 1. It turns out that the states of Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Madhya
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh are highly aligned states. The least aligned
state is West Bengal, which had an aligned state government only during the three initial
years (1974-75 to 1976-77).
The construction of the alignment dummy may give rise to some concern. Suppose that
at the start of nancial year t, the center and state s are governed by distinct coalitions that
have only a minimal party in common. Yet, despite the plainly tenuous overlap between the
two coalition governments, we code ALst to equal 1. Fortunately, such concerns are misplaced
19Notice that the date used to construct the alignment dummy is the date on which decisions regarding
central grant allocations are presumed to be made.
20Recall that Presidents Rule may be imposed on a state when the president of India is satised that
constitutional breakdown has occurred at the state level. We exclude Presidents Rule from our denition
of the alignment dummy since the center-state relationship during a spell of Presidents Rule is qualitatively
di¤erent from that in normal times.
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in the Indian context during the period under review. Between nancial years 1974-75 and
1996-97, the central government was a coalition for a total of two years and ve months.
Averaged over the 14 states, coalition governments at the state level accounted for a total of
one year and two months.21 In most instances, all the parties of a state government coalition
were either in power at the center or out of power at the center.
Consider, now, how we create the political control variables that indicate whether a state-
year (s; t) is swing or not.22 We construct the swing dummy to satisfy the following criteria:
First, it should be a relative measure in line with our theoretical model; and second, it should
take account of multi-party contests that are a standard feature of constituency-level elections
in India.
Our theoretical model shows that both Vidhan and Lok Sabha election outcomes may
a¤ect the ow of central funds. This means that we end up creating two sets of measures
of swing for state-year (s; t) one set is derived from Vidhan Sabha election outcomes while
the other is based on Lok Sabha election outcomes and include interactions between these
two sets of swing measures in our empirical model. Consistent with the construction of the
alignment dummy, the various swing measures for state-year (s; t) use outcomes from the last
Vidhan and Lok Sabha elections as viewed from the decision date pegged at March 31 of
nancial year (t  1).
Our construction of the swing measures proceeds as follows. Given state-year (s; t), we
identify the last Vidhan Sabha and Lok Sabha elections occurring in state s prior to nancial
year t.23 Now, for both elections, we observe the vote shares of the contending political parties
in each of the electoral constituencies of state s. So, for each election, we rst dene a variable
winmarg, which for electoral constituency i is the di¤erence in the percentage vote shares of
the two political parties that secure the highest number of votes in constituency i (see footnote
for further details);24 this done, we classify electoral constituency i as a swingconstituency
if its winmarg value is less than or equal to the cuto¤ value of one percent. Let vswing01st
and lswing01st denote, respectively, the proportion of such swing constituencies in state s in
the identied Vidhan and Lok Sabha elections. Additionally, we create variables vswing02st
to vswing10st and lswing02st to lswing10st as the proportion of constituencies in state s
that have winmarg values less than or equal to two percent to 10 percent in the identied
Vidhan and Lok Sabha elections. These cuto¤ values capture the tightness" of the race in a
constituency when multiple parties (two or more) contest the election.
The state-specic means of eight proportion of swing constituenciesvariables that is,
21For each state s, we computed the number of months between nancial years 1974-75 and 1996-97 during
which the state government was a coalition. The average of these numbers over the 14 states is 14 months.
22Note that we use state-year (s; t)as a shorthand for state-nancial year (s; t).
23For concreteness, consider the nancial year 1974-75. To obtain the swing measures, we identify the last
Vidhan Sabha and Lok Sabha elections occurring before March 31, 1974.
24Let there be K political parties contending a Vidhan Sabha election in electoral constituency i of state s.
Let the votes received by party 1 be v1, the votes received by party 2 be v2, and so on. If party 1 is highest
vote-getter in constituency i and party 2 is the second highest vote-getter in constituency i, then winmarg for
constituency i in the Vidhan Sabha election under review is 100  (v1   v2)=PKj=1 vj . Ideally, we would like
to use eligible voting population of constituency i as the denominator in the calculation of its winmarg value
since there may be concerns regarding the possible endogeneity of the voter turnout variable. However, in the
Indian context, we believe that this is unlikely to be a serious problem; Ghosh (2006) shows that electoral
turnout in Lok Sabha constituencies is not robustly explained by the predicted closeness of the election.
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vswing01, vswing02, vswing05, vswing10, lswing01, lswing02, lswing05 and lswing10 
are provided in Panel [1] of Table 3. Column [1] shows that over our sample period, in the
states of Haryana, Kerala and Uttar Pradesh, over six percent of Vidhan Sabha constituencies
witnessed elections in which the winning margin (that is, winmarg) was not more than one
percent; in marked contrast, the corresponding numbers for the states of Gujarat and West
Bengal are less than three percent. Column [2] raises the winning margin to two percent.
Notice, now, that over our sample period, over 14 percent of Vidhan Sabha constituencies in
Kerala witnessed elections wherein the winning margin was not more than two percent. Panel
[1] highlights an important contrast between Vidhan and Lok Sabha elections. Since Vidhan
Sabha elections primarily center on local issues, small" political parties with narrow and
localized support bases often contest Vidhan Sabha elections while opting out of Lok Sabha
elections. The spreading of votes over a larger set of contending political parties makes the
winning margin in Vidhan Sabha elections on average lower than that in Lok Sabha elections.
This is best seen by considering the proportion of Vidhan and Lok Sabha swing constituencies
averaged over the 14 states in our study: with the winning margin set at one percent, two
percent, ve percent and 10 percent, the proportions of Vidhan Sabha swing constituencies in
the 14 states are, respectively, 0:046, 0:089, 0:220 and 0:411; the corresponding proportions
for Lok Sabha elections, viz. 0:039, 0:079, 0:174 and 0:345, are uniformly lower.
Although the various proportion of swing constituenciesmeasures enable us to pick up
the closeness of Vidhan and Lok Sabha elections in each state, the testing of our model
predictions with these variables is not straightforward. Instead, our model testing is based
on a set of swing dummies, each of which is derived from the corresponding proportion of
swing constituencies variable (vswing01st is transformed to vswingdum01st, lswing01st is
transformed to lswingdum01st, and so on). The swing dummies are constructed as follows.
Take, for example, the vswing01 variable which refers to Vidhan Sabha elections and uses
the one percent cuto¤ value for the winning margin (that is, winmarg). For nancial year
t, we rst calculate the median value of vswing01st across all states s that have a positive
vswing01st. Let this median value be denoted medt. Given medt, we now let vswingdum01st
take the value of 1 (respectively, 0) if vswing01st strictly exceeds (respectively, is weakly less
than) medt. Notice that under our denition, 50 percent of the states with non-zero values of
vswing01 in nancial year t are classied as swing states in that year.
The state-specic means of the eight swing dummies (two election types  four cuto¤
values for the winning margin) are given in Panel [2] of Table 3. Consider Column [1] of
Panel [2]. With the winning margin set at one percent, the relevant swing dummies are
vswingdum01 and lswingdum01. Now, focus on the state of Bihar. Column [1] indicates that
out of the 23 sample years, Bihar was coded as a swing state on 17 occasions (0:739  23)
using the variable vswingdum01 and coded as a swing state on eight occasions (0:348  23)
using the variable lswingdum01. The results in Panel [2] are in conformity with widely held
views regarding the political competitiveness of Indian states. With respect to Vidhan Sabha
elections, the principal focus of our study, Panel [2] identies Bihar, Kerala and Uttar Pradesh
as highly swing states. Vidhan Sabha elections in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh are multi-party
contests and a small vote swing in favor of any one political party leads to vast changes in the
seat shares of the contending parties. Vidhan Sabha elections in Kerala, on the other hand,
have centered on two pre-poll alliances one alliance is led by the Congress Party while the
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other is led by the Communist Party of India (Marxist). Over the years, the electoral margins
have been razor thin and the two alliances have taken turns in forming the state government.
4.2 Other Controls
The set of other controlscomprises six regressors: annual rainfall, state population, propor-
tion of state population characterized as scheduled caste or scheduled tribe, per capita state
domestic product in constant prices (1980-81 rupees), the share of agriculture in state domes-
tic product, and states per capita allocation of the proceeds of central taxes, as determined
by the Finance Commission, in constant prices (1980-81 rupees).25 Summary statistics for
these regressors are given in Column [3] to [8] of Table 2.
We briey outline why we condition the allocation of central grants on the set of other
controls. State incomes derived from agriculture depend on rainfall levels; central grants
may provide insurance to state governments by responding to rainfall shocks. Rao and Singh
(1998, 2001) argue that state population per se is frequently a measure of political inuence;
central grants may therefore be disproportionately skewed towards populous states. Scheduled
castes and scheduled tribes represent historically disadvantaged groupings of citizens; equity
considerations could induce a positive relationship between grant awards and the share of
such groups in statespopulation. Equity concerns also lead us to believe that poorer states
will receive more of the central pie than richer states. Chakraborty (2003), on the other
hand, argues that state income is a good proxy for lobbying power. This suggests that central
transfers in India may actually be regressive. Farmers and industrialists represent distinct
lobbies with disparate interests. The strengths of these two groups play a role in determining
whether industrial states are favored in terms of grant awards relative to agricultural states.
Alternatively, public investments may have greater value in industrial states (e.g., because of
higher population density). Here, economic e¢ ciency considerations could induce a negative
relationship between the volume of central grants and the share of agriculture in state domestic
product. Finally, why do we use the explicitly formula-based per capita allocation of central
tax revenues as a regressor? It is generally agreed that the Finance Commission, which
determines statesshare of central tax revenues, does not exhibit noticeable political bias and
instead bases its awards on variables that reect statesgenuine need for central assistance.
By using these Finance Commission transfers as a regressor, we ask whether the variables
on which we focus the swing and alignment dummies account for central grants once we
control for statesneeds as perceived by the Finance Commission.26
25As pointed out in Section 3, the Finance Commission determines statesshares of central tax revenues and
recommends grants-in-aid to states under Article 275 of the constitution of India. We note that the dependent
variable Constitutional Transfers" in Khemani (2007) is the sum of states per capita allocation of the central
tax proceeds" (a regressor in our empirical model) and states per capita allocation of Finance Commission
grants."
26Of course, it is impossible to establish that the Finance Commission transfers we consider are politically
neutral. Therefore, in Section 6 we show that our results are substantively unchanged if we exclude the Finance
Commission transfer variable from the set of regressors.
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5 Empirical Model and Results
In our theoretical model, the party in power at the center maximizes the objective function
in equation (4) subject to an aggregate budget constraint. The maximization problem yields
a behavioral function where the supply of central grants to a particular state depends on the
exogenous characteristics of all states. Our empirical work does not estimate this behavioral
function. Instead, we record the grants given by the central incumbent to the various states
and ask the following question: Is there an association between the central grant awards and
the political factors identied by our theoretical model? To this end, we estimate the following
log-linear model for grants:
ln(grants)st = 
0pst + 0xst + s + t + ust (13)
where grantsst is the per capita real grants (on account of central plan schemes and centrally
sponsored schemes) from the center to state s in nancial year t, pst is the vector of political
controls, and xst is the vector of other explanatory variables. To account for unobserved state
specic e¤ects, we include state specic dummies, s; similarly, time specic dummies, t,
are included to account for unobserved time specic e¤ects. The model is estimated using
ordinary least squares. The resulting estimators are consistent provided the unobserved state
specic and time specic e¤ects are su¢ cient to account for any possible correlation between
the regressors and the error term.
How are the political controlsin equation (13) constructed? In Section 4.1, we described
an array of swing dummies (vswingdum01, lswingdum01, and so on), each of which was
formed on the basis of either Vidhan or Lok Sabha election outcomes. From within this set
of swing dummies, a specic empirical model rst selects one swing dummy based on Vidhan
Sabha election outcomes (call this V SW ) and one swing dummy based on Lok Sabha election
outcomes (call this LSW ). This done, the political controlsinclude all relevant interactions
between the alignment dummy, AL, and the two chosen swing dummies, V SW and LSW .
For ease of discussion, we write the political e¤ects as follows:
0pst = 1ALst  V SWst  LSWst + 2ALst  V SWst  (1  LSWst) + (14)
3ALst  (1  V SWst)  LSWst + 4ALst  (1  V SWst)  (1  LSWst) +
5(1 ALst)  V SWst  LSWst + 6(1 ALst)  V SWst  (1  LSWst) +
7(1 ALst)  (1  V SWst)  LSWst:
Our basic empirical model selects vswingdum01 to be the Vidhan Sabha swing dummy,
VSW, and lswingdum01 to be the Lok Sabha swing dummy, LSW, in equation (14).27 Column
[2] of Table 4 reports the regression results for the basic model.28 Five conclusions follow
directly from these results.
27Recall that vswingdum01 (respectively, lswingdum01) denes a Vidhan Sabha (respectively, Lok Sabha)
constituency to be swingif the winning margin is less than or equal to the one percent cuto¤ value.
28Given the focus of our paper, we only present the coe¢ cient estimates related to the political variables in
Table 4. The detailed results are available on request from the authors.
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First, we nd that the only coe¢ cients that are signicantly di¤erent from zero are the
coe¢ cients on (i) AL V SW LSW and (ii) AL V SW  (1 LSW ). A state that is aligned
and swing in both the last Vidhan Sabha and the last Lok Sabha elections is estimated to
receive 19.6 percent (exp(0:179)  1) higher central grants than a state that is unaligned and
non-swing with respect to both election types (the base case in our empirical model); an
aligned state that is swing in the last Vidhan Sabha but non-swing in the last Lok Sabha
election is estimated to receive 13.9 percent (exp(0:130) 1) higher central grants than a state
that is unaligned and non-swing with respect to both election types.
Second, it turns out that the null hypothesis 1   2 = 0 is not rejected at conventional
levels of signicance.29 Consider, now, an aligned state for which the Vidhan Sabha swing
dummy, V SW , assumes the value of one. With 1 equal to 2, notice that central grants to
this state are not conditioned on the value of the Lok Sabha swing dummy, LSW . Thus, our
empirical ndings highlight the key role of Vidhan Sabha election outcomes in determining
central transfers. A possible explanation for this is that Vidhan Sabha elections feature many
more candidates and are held far more frequently than Lok Sabha elections.
Third, consider a state that is aligned and swing in the last Vidhan Sabha election (the Lok
Sabha swing dummy can be either zero or one). The coe¢ cients on the variables in Column
[2] indicate that such a state receives higher central grants than a state that is unaligned,
regardless of its swing characteristics (see footnote for details).30
Fourth, consider a state that is aligned and swing in the last Vidhan Sabha election (the Lok
Sabha swing dummy can be either zero or one). The coe¢ cients on the variables in Column
[2] indicate that such a state receives higher central grants than a state that is aligned but
non-swing, dened here as a state with V SW equal to zero (see footnote for details).31
Fifth, conclusions three and four jointly imply that a state with AL and V SW equal to
one is favored by the central incumbent relative to a non-swing state (V SW equal to zero),
regardless of its alignment.
For comparison purposes, we also report the baseline regression without other (that is,
non-political) controlsin Column [1] of Table 4. Comparing Columns [1] and [2], we see that
the main coe¢ cient of interest, that on AL  V SW  LSW , remains positive and signicant
when other controlsare excluded from the model.
In summary, there is clear evidence of the Aligned Swing E¤ect emphasized in our theo-
retical model.
6 Robustness Issues
Section 6 consists of two parts. In the rst part, we consider several variants of our basic model
but do not tinker with the two swing dummies, VSW and LSW, used in the construction of
the political controls. In the second part, we study how the conclusions in Section 5 are
a¤ected when the swing dummies are constructed somewhat di¤erently.
29Our results show that (^1   ^2) is equal to 0.049 with a standard error of 0.054.
30This conclusion follows since standard hypothesis tests establish: (i) 1 > 0; (ii) 2 > 0; and (iii) (i  j) >
0, i = 1; 2 and j = 5; 6; 7.
31This conclusion follows since standard hypothesis tests establish: (i) (1   3) and (1   4) exceed 0;
and (ii) (2   3) and (2   4) exceed 0.
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6.1 Variants of the Basic Model
Recall that our basic model has the following three features: rst, we maintained that central
grants-related decisions for nancial year t are made on the basis of political considerations
prevailing on March 31 of nancial year (t 1); second, we included states per capita allocation
of central tax revenues, as determined by the Finance Commission, in our set of regressors;
and third, the construction of the alignment dummy classied a spell of Presidents Rule as a
period of center-state nonalignment. Consider what happens to our results when these three
features of the basic model are changed one at a time.
Variant 1 of the basic model (Column [3] of Table 4) uses March 1 of nancial year (t  1)
as the date on which central grant allocations for nancial year t are decided (see footnote
for details).32 Shifting the decision date by a month (from March 31 to March 1) leaves the
conclusions of the basic model unaltered: as in Section 5, the coe¢ cients that are signicantly
di¤erent from zero are the coe¢ cients on (i) ALV SW LSW and (ii) ALV SW (1 LSW ).
Variant 2 of the basic model (Column [4] of Table 4) excludes the Finance Commission
transfers from the set of regressors. While the results in Column [4] are somewhat worse than
those in Column [2] (the coe¢ cient on AL  V SW  (1   LSW ) is statistically signicant at
only the 10 percent level and the models R2 goes down), the substantive implications of the
two sets of results are broadly similar.
Variant 3 of the basic model (Column [5] of Table 4) constructs the alignment dummy by
implicitly classifying a period of Presidents Rule as a spell of center-state alignment (see foot-
note for details).33 This alteration in the treatment of Presidents Rule makes little di¤erence
to the conclusions of the basic model: while the coe¢ cients in Column [5] are mostly larger
than those in Column [2], the same two variables are signicant in both cases.
Finally, in Variant 4 (Column [6] of Table 4), we re-estimate the basic model with po-
litical controlsconsisting of three separate regressors: AL, vswing01 and lswing01.34 Two
conclusions follow from Column [6] estimates. First, the coe¢ cient on the alignment dummy
is not statistically signicant from zero, implying that central grants are not conditioned per
se on whether a state is aligned or not. The Core Support hypothesis (Cox and McCubbins
(1986), Case (2001)) states that the central government uses grants to reward its core sup-
port: in Case (2001) this is tested empirically using the proportion of voters in a constituency
that vote for the leading party in the national election. Observe that the central incumbents
vote share in the state election (Cases core support measure) and the alignment dummy are
positively correlated so that ceteris paribus, aligned states have higher core support than un-
32The shift in the decision date from March 31, as in the basic model, to March 1 forces us to redene the
variables comprising political controlsin the following two ways: (i) the dummy variable ALst is now coded as
1 if the central government and the government of state s on March 1 of nancial year (t 1) share at least one
political party in common and there is no Presidents Rule in state s on that date; and (ii) the construction of
the various swing measures for state-year (s; t) is based on the last Vidhan and Lok Sabha elections occurring
in state s before March 1 of nancial year (t  1).
33Fix a state-year (s; t). Then, ALst in Variant 3 of the basic model is coded as 1 if the central government
and the government of state s on March 31 of nancial year (t 1) share at least one political party in common
or there is Presidents Rule in state s on that date.
34Recall that vswing01st and lswing01st are, respectively, the proportion of swingconstituencies (dened
with respect to the one percent cuto¤ value for the winning margin) in the last Vidhan and Lok Sabha elections
in state s occurring prior to nancial year t.
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aligned states. Hence, one test of the Core Support hypothesis would be that alignment (by
itself) matters for grants. Our rst conclusion therefore suggests that there is no evidence for
the Core Support hypothesis.35 Second, the coe¢ cient on vswing01 is positive and signi-
cantly di¤erent from zero. So, an increase in the proportion of swing constituencies in the last
Vidhan Sabha election increases the central grants received by a state.
6.2 Varying the Cuto¤Value
The results in Section 5 show that Lok Sabha election outcomes do not impact central trans-
fers. So, we re-estimate the basic model given in Column [2] of Table 4 without the Lok Sabha
swing dummy, LSW . Column [1] of Table 5 provides the regression estimates.
Before discussing these estimates, we observe that the political controlsof our empirical
model now consists of three interacted variables: AL V SW , AL  (1 V SW ) and (1 AL) 
V SW . Let 1; 2 and 3 denote, respectively, the coe¢ cients on ALV SW; AL(1 V SW )
and (1 AL)V SW . Two main conclusions follow from Column [1] estimates. First, we note
that the only coe¢ cient that is signicantly di¤erent from zero is the coe¢ cients on ALV SW .
A state that is both aligned and swing in the last Vidhan Sabha election is estimated to receive
16 percent (exp(0:148)  1) higher grants than a state that is unaligned and non-swing in the
last Vidhan Sabha election (the base case in our empirical model). Second, it turns out that
(1   2) is positive and signicantly di¤erent from zero. This means that within the set of
aligned states, states that are swing in the last Vidhan Sabha election receive higher central
grants than states that are non-swing in the last Vidhan Sabha election. The two above
conclusions jointly imply that an aligned and swing state is favored by the central incumbent
relative to a state that is non-swing, regardless of its alignment. Summing up, the evidence
suggests that the allocation of central transfers in India satises the Aligned Swing E¤ect
property of our theoretical model.
Finally, we consider how our ndings change as we vary the construction of the Vidhan
Sabha swing dummy, V SW . Columns [2] to [4] of Table 5 report the regression results
when the Vidhan Sabha swing dummy is, respectively, vswingdum02, vswingdum05 and
vswingdum10.36 The results in Table 5 show that when the cuto¤ value for the winning
margin, used to decide whether a constituency is swingor not, is raised from one percent,
the coe¢ cient on AL  V SW remains positive in sign; however, statistical signicance is lost.
This suggests that only Vidhan Sabha constituencies witnessing especially close elections a¤ect
grant allocations of the central incumbent.
35Another way to empirically test the Core Support hypothesis would be to use the proportion of MPs in
the state that are from the ruling party at the center as a measure of core support. When we estimated this
specication, the e¤ect of the core support measure was found to be insignicant. The results are available on
request from the authors.
36Recall that vswingdum02, vswingdum05 and vswingdum10 dene a Vidhan Sabha constituency to be
swingif the winning margin is, respectively, less than or equal to the cuto¤ value of two percent, ve percent
and 10 percent.
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7 Conclusion
This paper constructs a model of redistributive politics where the central government is op-
portunistic and uses its discretion to make grants to state governments on the basis of political
considerations. These considerations are the alignment between the incumbent parties at the
central and state levels and whether a state is a swing state or not. The main testable predic-
tion from the model is that a state that is both swing and aligned with the central government
receives higher grants relative to a state that is non-swing, whether aligned with the central
government or otherwise. We test this prediction using Indian data for 14 states from 1974-75
to 1996-97. We nd that a state which is both aligned and swing in the last state election is
estimated to receive 16 percent higher grants than a state which is unaligned and non-swing.
Many empirical questions remain to be explored. Our study is conned to the analysis of
explicit center-state transfers in India. Yet, intergovernmental transfers in India are frequently
implicit (e.g., subsidized borrowing by states from the central government). A future study
could estimate the extent to which political factors account for such transfers. Biswas and
Marjit (2000) represent a start on this problem. They show that statesrepresentation in the
central government cabinet a¤ects the statewise distribution of industrial licenses.
Finally, we have tested but one half of the complete story. Specically, while central
governmentsgrant decisions were analyzed, voter behavior was left unaddressed. Does the
electorate, at the sub-national level, condition its vote on central grants? Some evidence, em-
ploying US data, already exists. Levitt and Snyder (1997) demonstrate that central spending
in a House district enhances the vote share of the incumbent member of Congress. Stein and
Bickers (1994) use survey data to establish that a voter is more likely to support the incumbent
House candidate when she is aware of new central grant awards to her district. Comparable
work with Indian data is non-existent. In sum, the analysis of voter behavior in India remains
a fruitful research topic.
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8 Data Appendix
The data used in the paper come from a variety of sources. They cover the 14 major states
of India and span the nancial years 1974-75 to 1996-97.
8.1 Center-State Transfer Variables
Transfers from the center to the states (various categories) are measured per capita in constant
prices (1980-81 rupees). Three categories of central transfers are considered: the allocation of
the proceeds of the central taxes as determined by the Finance Commission, grants on account
of central plan schemes, and grants on account of centrally sponsored schemes. The nominal
transfer data from the center to the states (various categories) are from the Reserve Bank of
India Bulletin, an annual publication of the Reserve Bank of India. The nominal transfer data
are deated using the implicit state domestic product deator (base year 1980-81), obtained
from the National Accounts Statistics (Government of India, Ministry of Planning, Depart-
ment of Statistics). The state population data, used to express magnitudes in per capita
terms, are obtained from the National Accounts Statistics.
8.2 Political Control Variables
The center-state alignment dummy was coded from Butler et al (1996) and Grover and Arora
(1998). The Vidhan Sabha swing dummy and the Lok Sabha swing dummy were coded,
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respectively, from Vidhan Sabha and Lok Sabha constituency-level electoral data, downloaded
from the website of the Election Commission of India (http://eci.gov.in).
8.3 Other Control Variables
The othercontrol variables are: (i) annual rainfall, (ii) per capita state domestic product
in constant prices (1980-81 rupees), (iii) the share of agriculture in state domestic product,
(iv) state population, (v) the proportion of state population characterized as scheduled caste
or scheduled tribe, and (vi) states per capita allocation of the proceeds of central taxes, as
determined by the Finance Commission, in constant prices (1980-81 rupees).
The annual rainfall data are from the Statistical Abstract of India (Government of India,
Ministry of Planning, Department of Statistics). Data for variables (ii)-(iv) are from the
National Accounts Statistics. The proportion of state population characterized as scheduled
caste or scheduled tribe is estimated from the decennial Census of India (Government of India,
O¢ ce of the Registrar General) for the years 1971, 1981, 1991 and 2001. Between any two
successive censuses, total state population and scheduled caste/scheduled tribe population are
assumed to grow at a constant rate. For the variable (vi) data source, refer to Center-State
Transfer Variables."
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Table 1: Lok Sabha election outcomes 1962-1996 
 
Lok Sabha Election Year 
 
Government Formation  
1962 Congress Party (Prime Minister: Jawaharlal Nehru)
1967 Congress Party (Prime Minister: Indira Gandhi)
1971 Congress Party (Prime Minister: Indira Gandhi)
1977 Janata Party (Prime Ministers: Morarji Desai and Charan Singh) 
1980 Congress Party (Prime Minister: Indira Gandhi)
1984 Congress Party (Prime Minister: Rajiv Gandhi)
1989 National Front, a coalition of Janata Dal and regional parties (Prime Ministers: V.P. Singh and 
Chandra Shekhar)
1991 Congress Party (Prime Minister: P.V.  Narasimha Rao)
1996 Bharatiya Janata Party (government lasts for less than two weeks) and United Front, a coalition of 
Janata Dal and regional parties (Prime Ministers: H.D. Deve Gowda and I.K. Gujral)
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 1974/75 – 1996/97 
 
 Per Capita Grants: 
Central Plan 
Schemes+ 
Centrally 
Sponsored 
Schemes 
(in 1980-81 
rupees) 
 
[1] 
 
Alignment 
Variable 
(March 31) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[2] 
Annual 
Rainfall 
(in meters) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[3] 
State 
Population 
(in millions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[4] 
Share of State 
Population 
characterized as 
Scheduled Caste 
or Scheduled 
Tribe  
 
 
 
[5] 
Per Capita 
State Domestic 
Product (in  
1980-81 rupees) 
 
 
 
 
 
[6] 
 
Share of 
Agriculture in 
State Domestic 
Product 
(in percentage) 
 
 
 
 
[7] 
Per Capita  
Allocation of Central 
Tax Proceeds, 
determined by the 
Finance Commission 
(in 1980-81 rupees) 
 
 
 
[8] 
 
State Mean SD Mean Mean SD Mean Mean Mean SD Mean Mean SD 
Andhra Pradesh 86.60 33.48 0.39 0.95 0.12 59.5 0.21 1355.22 139.25 39.3 293 79 
Bihar 60.35 33.92 0.70 1.28 0.13 77.8 0.23 607.36 60.93 43.8 321 111 
Gujarat 72.52 30.93 0.70 0.69 0.19 37.5 0.22 2949.73 412.46 30.2 227 65 
Haryana 88.58 32.10 0.87 0.70 0.17 14.6 0.19 8597.66 618.28 47.9 201 39 
Karnataka 81.92 32.03 0.39 1.85 0.40 40.8 0.19 2069.53 187.56 38.3 261 59 
Kerala 57.19 24.66 0.52 2.68 0.35 27.1 0.11 2523.62 283.35 34.9 242 56 
Madhya Pradesh 65.90 28.14 0.74 1.12 0.13 58.8 0.37 945.65 66.55 42.6 232 49 
Maharashtra 66.06 28.34 0.70 0.88 0.14 70.4 0.18 1669.00 183.36 23.1 218 30 
Orissa 86.15 32.01 0.78 1.44 0.20 28.8 0.38 1781.90 152.76 45.3 273 84 
Punjab 74.01 37.72 0.56 0.73 0.15 18.4 0.27 8892.37 586.59 46.4 241 48 
Rajasthan 115.61 57.27 0.65 0.54 0.12 38.9 0.29 1763.52 182.38 47.6 257 77 
Tamil Nadu 59.43 27.38 0.35 0.99 0.13 52.0 0.20 1455.10 229.48 23.7 260 54 
Uttar Pradesh 63.24 37.36 0.70 1.15 0.16 124.0 0.21 467.38 20.17 44.7 267 77 
West Bengal 38.69 18.02 0.13 2.05 0.33 60.8 0.28 1485.46 79.46 32.4 282 75 
Average 72.59 37.34 0.58 1.22 0.62 50.6 0.24 2611.68 2604.93 38.6 255 73 
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Table 3 – Descriptive statistics of “Swing” measures                 
 
Proportion of constituencies with winning margin 
[1] 
Proportion of times the state was a swing state 
 [2] 
 State Elections – Vidhan Sabha 
State ≤1% ≤2% ≤5% ≤10% ≤1% ≤2% ≤5% ≤10% 
Andhra Pradesh 0.046 0.084 0.217 0.415 0.435 0.435 0.435 0.435 
Bihar 0.052 0.097 0.235 0.422 0.739 0.783 0.783 0.783 
Gujarat 0.029 0.068 0.155 0.301 0 0.087 0 0 
Haryana 0.061 0.105 0.233 0.422 0.609 0.609 0.609 0.609 
Karnataka 0.042 0.081 0.205 0.397 0.435 0.522 0.522 0.435 
Kerala 0.073 0.144 0.383 0.671 0.826 1 1 1 
Madhya Pradesh 0.037 0.083 0.203 0.384 0.304 0.348 0.348 0.304 
Maharashtra 0.038 0.069 0.190 0.372 0.217 0.130 0.304 0.348 
Orissa 0.034 0.067 0.169 0.330 0.522 0.478 0.261 0.261 
Punjab 0.046 0.088 0.245 0.452 0.391 0.435 0.783 0.783 
Rajasthan 0.051 0.094 0.218 0.397 0.565 0.565 0.696 0.609 
Tamil Nadu 0.040 0.085 0.199 0.360 0.435 0.435 0.435 0.435 
Uttar Pradesh 0.060 0.113 0.271 0.505 0.957 1 0.826 1 
West Bengal 0.029 0.067 0.160 0.328 0.174 0.174 0 0 
Average 0.046 0.089 0.220 0.411 0.472 0.5 0.5 0.5 
 National Elections – Lok Sabha 
Andhra Pradesh 0.035 0.086 0.174 0.401 0.435 0.435 0.522 0.652 
Bihar 0.032 0.053 0.140 0.277 0.348 0.435 0.348 0.435 
Gujarat 0.031 0.076 0.161 0.384 0.130 0.348 0.478 0.478 
Haryana 0.088 0.112 0.164 0.413 0.652 0.435 0.435 0.522 
Karnataka 0.043 0.068 0.154 0.278 0.565 0.348 0.522 0.565 
Kerala 0.057 0.189 0.376 0.672 0.435 0.870 0.870 1 
Madhya Pradesh 0.020 0.049 0.133 0.259 0 0.217 0.217 0.217 
Maharashtra 0.016 0.031 0.120 0.260 0.087 0.087 0.217 0.435 
Orissa 0.021 0.081 0.173 0.325 0 0.348 0.478 0.478 
Punjab 0.043 0.094 0.167 0.314 0.565 0.435 0.565 0.435 
Rajasthan 0.024 0.064 0.160 0.304 0.130 0.348 0.435 0.565 
Tamil Nadu 0.012 0.023 0.080 0.140 0 0 0.217 0 
Uttar Pradesh 0.040 0.078 0.190 0.332 0.304 0.522 0.522 0.522 
West Bengal 0.082 0.106 0.246 0.469 0.565 0.348 0.435 0.435 
Average 0.039 0.079 0.174 0.345 0.301 0.37 0.447 0.481 
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Notes:  
(i) The top half of Panel [1] refers to Vidhan Sabha elections. Column [1] (≤ 1%), Column [2] (≤ 2%), Column [3] (≤ 5%) and Column [4] (≤ 10%) show, 
respectively, the state-specific means of vswing01, vswing02, vswing05 and vswing10. See text for details.  
(ii) The bottom half of Panel [1] refers to Lok Sabha elections. Column [1] (≤ 1%), Column [2] (≤ 2%), Column [3] (≤ 5%) and Column [4] (≤ 10%) show, 
respectively, the state-specific means of lswing01, lswing02, lswing05 and lswing10. See text for details.  
(iii) The top half of Panel [2] refers to Vidhan Sabha elections. Fix a state-financial year. The state-financial year is coded as ‘swing’ if the proportion of 
Vidhan Sabha constituencies in the state that are ‘swing’ is greater than the median value for the proportion taken over all states in the given financial 
year. In Column [1] (≤ 1%), Column [2] (≤ 2%), Column [3] (≤ 5%) and Column [4] (≤ 10%), a Vidhan Sabha constituency is defined as ‘swing’ if the 
winning margin is weakly less than, respectively, 1 percent, 2 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent. Thus, Column [1], [2], [3] and [4] show, respectively, 
the state-specific means of vswingdum01, vswingdum02, vswingdum05 and vswingdum10. See text for details.   
(iv) The bottom half of Panel [2] refers to Lok Sabha elections. Fix a state-financial year. The state-financial year is coded as ‘swing’ if the proportion of 
Lok Sabha constituencies in the state that are ‘swing’ is greater than the median value for the proportion taken over all states in the given financial year. 
In Column [1] (≤ 1%), Column [2] (≤ 2%), Column [3] (≤ 5%) and Column [4] (≤ 10%), a Lok Sabha constituency is defined as ‘swing’ if the winning 
margin is weakly less than, respectively, 1 percent, 2 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent. Thus, Column [1], [2], [3] and [4] show, respectively, the state-
specific means of lswingdum01, lswingdum02, lswingdum05 and lswingdum10. See text for details.    
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Table 4: Least squares (within-group estimation) results for per capita grants 
 
 Basic Model 
Without ‘Other 
Controls’ 
[1] 
Basic Model 
 
 
[2] 
Variant 1 
 
 
[3] 
Variant 2 
 
 
[4] 
Variant 3 
 
 
[5] 
Variant 4 
 
 
[6] 
AL*VSW* LSW 0.135 (1.87) 0.179 (2.58) 0.188 (2.80) 0.177 (2.52) 0.222 (2.76)  
AL*VSW*(1 – LSW) 0.087 (1.30) 0.130 (2.09) 0.140 (2.23) 0.118 (1.84) 0.190 (2.75)  
AL* (1 – VSW)*LSW -0.057 (0.75) -0.026 (0.37) -0.002 (0.02) -0.040 (0.55) 0.051 (0.65)  
AL* (1 – VSW)*(1 – LSW) -0.041 (0.06) -0.005 (0.10) 0.001 (0.16) -0.033 (0.54) 0.096 (1.60)  
(1 – AL)*VSW* LSW 0.005 (0.08) 0.011 (0.15) 0.019 (0.25) 0.019 (0.27) 0.040 (0.49)  
(1 – AL)*VSW*(1 – LSW) 0.039 (0.69) 0.035 (0.60) 0.023 (0.38) 0.038 (0.65) 0.093 (1.31)  
(1 – AL)* (1 – VSW)*LSW 0.004 (0.05) -0.012 (0.17) -0.019 (0.24) -0.008 (0.11) 0.023 (0.30)  
Alignment Dummy      0.055 (1.38) 
Proportion of constituencies in 
the state that are swing in 
the last state election 
      
1.470 (2.38) 
Proportion of constituencies in 
the state that are swing in 
the last national election 
      
0.190 (0.59) 
R2 (within group) 0.850 0.860 0.861 0.853 0.861 0.856 
Alignment Date March 31 March 31 March 1 March 31 March 31 March 31 
Finance Commission grant Excluded Included Included Excluded Included Included 
President’s Rule included in 
the definition of Alignment 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
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Notes:  
(i) The dependent variable is the natural log of per capita grants in 1980-81 rupees, where grants is defined as the sum of central plan scheme grants and 
centrally sponsored scheme grants. There are 14 states observed over 23 years in the sample. Specification [1] only includes state and time dummies. All 
the other regressions also include the following variables: ln(annual rainfall), ln(state population), proportion of state population characterized as scheduled 
caste or scheduled tribe, ln(per capita state domestic product (in constant 1980-81 rupees)), the share of agriculture in state domestic product, and, in some 
specifications, the ln(per capita allocation of central tax proceeds, as determined by the Finance Commission (in constant 1980-81 rupees)). 
(ii) Fix a state-financial year. VSW takes the value of 1 if the proportion of Vidhan Sabha constituencies in the state that are ‘swing’ is greater than the median 
value for the proportion taken over all states in the given financial year. A constituency is defined as ‘swing’ if the winning margin is less than or equal to 1 
percent. 
(iii) Fix a state-financial year. LSW takes the value of 1 if the proportion of Lok Sabha constituencies in the state that are ‘swing’ is greater than the median 
value for the proportion taken over all states in the given financial year. A constituency is defined as ‘swing’ if the winning margin is less than or equal to 1 
percent. 
(iv) Fix a state-financial year. AL takes the value of 1 if the central and state governments on a specified date (March 1 of the previous financial year in Column 
[3] and March 31 of the previous financial year in Columns [1], [2], [4], [5] and [6]) share at least one political party in common; the treatment of 
President’s Rule in the construction of AL is given in the final row of Table 4. 
(v) The absolute t-ratios given in parentheses are based on robust standard errors that correct for clustering at the state level. 
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Table 5: Least squares (within-group estimation) results for per capita grants – Sensitivity to changes in cutoff margins 
 
 Definition of Vidhan Sabha swing dummy, VSW, based on winning margin being less than: 
     
 1%  [1] 2%  [2] 5%  [3] 10%  [4] 
 AL*VSW  0.148 (2.63) 0.050 (0.81) 0.040 (0.69) 0.083 (1.44) 
 AL*(1 – VSW) -0.007 (0.14) -0.004 (0.07) 0.009 (0.17) -0.002 (0.04) 
 (1 – AL)*VSW  0.031 (0.67) -0.063 (1.13) -0.057 (1.02) -0.031 (0.57) 
R2  (Within group) 0.860 0.855 0.854 0.856 
 
Notes:  
(i) The model in [1] is the same as [2] in Table 4 excluding the Lok Sabha swing dummy.  
(ii) Fix a state-financial year. AL takes the value of 1 if the central and state governments on March 31 of the previous financial year share at least one political 
party in common and there is no President’s Rule in the state on that date. 
(iii) Fix a state-financial year. VSW takes the value of 1 if the proportion of Vidhan Sabha constituencies in the state that are ‘swing’ is greater than the median 
value for the proportion taken over all states in the given financial year. In Column [1], [2], [3] and [4] a constituency is defined as ‘swing’ if the winning 
margin is weakly less than,  respectively, 1 percent, 2 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent. 
(iv) Also see notes to Table 4. 
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Appendix Table 1: Alignment and Swing dummies using one percent cutoff used in the basic regression 
State  1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Andhra AL 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
 VS  0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
 LS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Bihar AL 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 VS  0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
 LS 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gujarat AL 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
 VS  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 LS 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Haryana AL 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 VS  1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
 LS 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Karnataka AL 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
 VS  0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
 LS 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Kerala AL 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
 VS  1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
 LS 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
MP AL 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
 VS  1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
 LS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maharashtra AL 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
 VS  0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 LS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Orissa AL 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
 VS  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
 LS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Punjab AL 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
 VS  1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 LS 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Rajasthan AL 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 VS  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
 LS 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tamil Nadu AL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
 VS  0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 LS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
UP AL 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 VS  1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 LS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
West Bengal AL 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 VS  1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 LS 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
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Notes:  
(i) The decision date used is March 31.   
(ii) Fix a state-financial year. AL takes the value of 1 if the central and state governments on March 31 of the previous financial year share at least one political party in 
common and there is no President’s Rule in the state on that date.  
(iii) Fix a state-financial year. VS (LS) takes the value of 1 if Vidhan Sabha (Lok Sabha) election outcomes result in the state being classified as a swing state in the 
given financial year. A state is defined as a swing state if the proportion of constituencies in the state that are swing (winning margin less than or equal to one 
percent) is greater than the median value for the proportion taken over all states in the given financial year. 
(iv) MP (see the column showing state names) refers to Madhya Pradesh; UP refers to Uttar Pradesh.   
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